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(41 C.2d £55; 262 P.2d 846]

[So F. No. 18859. In Bank. Nov. 6, 1953.]

BERT LANGLEY, Respondent, V. PACIFIC GAS AND
ELECTRIC CO)IP ANY, Appellant.
[1) Electricity-Duties of· Electric Oompames.-While. provisions
of rule 14 of Public Utilities Commission requiring an electric
company to exercise reasonable diligence and care to furnish
a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity to its customers, and further declaring that such company shan not
be liable for interruption or shortage of supply or any loss
or damage occasioned thereby except that arising from its
failure to exercise reasonable diligence, make clear that such
company is not an insurer or guarantor of service, they do
not abrogate its general duty to exercise reasonable care in
operating its system to a,oid unreasonable risks of harm to
persons and property of its customers. (See Pub. Util. Code,
§ 451.)
(2) ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-Where defendant electric
company knew that a eontinuous supply of electric current
was necessary to operate plaintiff's fish hatchery,knew that
it could assure that supply either by furnishing current itself
or by promptly not~ plaintiff of any failure so that he
could obtain a substitute supply, and had twice notified plaintiff of an interruption of its service, and where plaintiff had
given defendant his telephone number, the repairman who
restored service was ealled to duty by a night telephone operator at defendant's office. and had that operator been given
a list of customers to call in event of power failure the loss
of plaintiff's fish as a result of failure to give notice of power
shortage would have been averted, defendant failed to exerme reasonable care toward plaintiff.
(8] ld.--Duties of Electric Companies.-In absence of knowledge
of particular needs of a customer, a utility is not required
to give notice of a power failure; if it has such knowledge,
it is required only to act in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances.
'
[4] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-It would not be unduly
burdensome to a utility, at least where a telephone operator
is on duty and utility has actual knowledge of power failure,
[1] See Oal.Jur., Electricity, § 8; Am.Jur., Electricity, § 32.
[2J Duty of public utility to notify patron in advance of temporary suspension of sernce, note, 52 A.L.R. 1078.
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Electricity, 510; [7] Electricity,
§ 25; [8, 9] Electricity, f 13.
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to require it to make a reasonable effort to give notice to
those customers who have informed it that they require notice
to prevent serious loss in event of interruption in power
supply.
[6] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-To require an electric
company to give notice to certain customers and not to others
does not conflict with public policy of state that no public
utility may grant any preference or advantage in its service
to its customers (Pub. Util. Code, § 453). since there is no
discrimination where the same duty to exercise reasonable
care and diligence is owed to all customers similarly situated.
[6] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-By undertaking to supply
electricity to plaintiff, defendant electric company obligates
itself to exercise reasonable care toward him, and failure to
exercise such care has characteristics of both a breach of
contract and a tort.
[7] ld.-Loss of Property-Pleading.-While for certain purposes,
such as statute of limitations and measure of damages
it may be necessary to classify an action against an electric company for loss of property due to power failure
as in contract or in tort, defendant was not prejudiced by
any error in pleading defendant's failure to give notice as
a breach of contract rather than as negligence, where action
was brought within period of shortest applicable statute of
limitations, and defendant knew of loss that might result
from its failure to give notice, so that the measnre of damages
under either theory was the same; and it was defendant's duty
under either theory to exercise reasonable diligence to notify
plaintiff of power failure.
[8] ld. - Oontracts - Actions - Instructions. - In action against
electric company for breach of written contract to furnish
plaintiff with power necessary to operate his fish hatchery,
any error in instructing jury with respect to an alleged oral
promise that bound defendant to give notice of power failure
was not prejudicial where jury, in returnmg verdict for
plaintiff, necessarily found that defendant was aware of
plaintiff's need for notice of power failure, that it failed
to give him notice, and that its failure was proximate cause
of death of flsh, since under these circumstances defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence.
[9] ld. - Oontracts - Actions - Instructions.-In action against
electric company for breach of written contract to furnish
plaintiff with power necessary to operate his fish hatchery,
it was prejudicial error to instruct jury that if it returned
a verdict in favor of plaintiff it could not award plaintiff
any less than 16 cents per fish, where amount of damages
. sustained by plaintiff was placed in issue by answer to com·
plaint and instrudion removed that issue from consideration
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of j1ll'Y. and where, although plaintiff's testimony was only
evidence concerning value of fish, jury was sole judge of his
credibility and should have been left free to disbelieve him.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. Byrl R. Salsman, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action for damages for breach of contract to supply electric
energy. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions to
retry issue of damages only.
Robert H. Gerdes, Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, W. R. Dunn and Austen D. Warburton for Appellant.
Louis W. Myers, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
James F. Boccardo and Edward J. Niland for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plainillf Bert Langley brought this action
against defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company for
breach of a contract wherein defendant allegedly agreed to
furnish plaintiff with power necessary to operate plaintiff's
fish hatchery, and in the event that delivery of power was suspended, to give reasonable notice of such suspension to plaintiff. The evidence at the trial established that a power failure
occurred, that defendant did not give plaintiff notice of such
failure, and that as a result 78,000 of plaintiff's trout died.
Plaintiff recovered judgment for $12,480 pursuant to a jury
verdict. Defendant appeals, contending that it did not breach
any contractual duty to plaintiff and that the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury.
Plaintiff built his hatchery in 1947. At the time of the
accident he had about 80,000 trout, in seven concrete troughs,
16 feet long, 16 inches wide, and 8 inches deep. It was
necessary to have a continuous flow of running water in
the troughs to supply oxygen to the trout. If the flow of
water were cut off, the trout would die in from 20 to 30
minutes. Plaintiff supplied water to the troughs by gravity
flow from a reservoir that was kept full by an electric pump.
The pump would automatically start and re:fill the reservoir
when the water dropped to a certain level. The reservoir
contained enough water to supply the troughs for about
three and a half hours after the pump stopped. Plaintiff
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did not have a standby pump at the hatchery. If the power
were shut off or the pump failed for any other reason, plaintiff
was prepared to protect the trout in two ways. He could
lessen the Bow of water from the reservoir to the troughs,
so that the water would not be exhausted until about eight
hours had passed. If it appeared that the pump could not
be operated within that time, he had made arrangements
for getting a portable gasoline power plant and pump within
an hour.
In 1947 plaintiff made arrangements with defendant for his
power supply. Plaintiff testified that he told defendant's
employees the nature of his business and of his need for a
continuous supply of running water. He asked whether
"you people have a man here, or service 24 hours a day,
whereby I could receive notice in the event that there is to
be a suspension of power.••. Otherwise, I will put in a
gasoline pump." The employees oraUyassured plaintiff that
he would be notified. Defendant began supplying plaintiff
with power in October, 1947. Apparently a written contract
was signed, although neither party produced it or a copy
thereof at the trial. Early in 1948 plaintiff read in a newspaper that there was a power shortage. He told one of defendant's employees that he wished to be notified when
there was a "brownout" and his power was cut off. He
gave the employee his telephone number. On two occasions
he received a notice from an employee, who stated that she
had instructions to notify him when power was suspended,
that on a certain date on a certain hour power would be sus·
pended in his area, and that he should govern himself accordingly. Plaintiff took appropriate precautions.
In the spring of 1948 plaintiff substituted a three horse·
power electric motor for the smaller motor that he had previ.
ously used. He asked defendant to supply him with additional
power. On May 12, 1948, he signed a written agreement for
the additional power at a rate different from that under the
former arrangement. The agreement provided that defendant
would furnish the electricity in accordance with the appli.
cable rules and regulations of the Public Utilities Commis·
sion. Rule 14 of the commission, relied upon by defendant,
is set forth in the footnote.- It is not clear from the record
""SHORTAGE OJ' SUPPLY AND INTERR·UP'1'lON OJ'DELIVERY

"The Company will exercise reasonable diligence and care to fumish
and deliver a continuous nnd sufficient supply of electri~ energy to the
customer, but does not auarantee continuiq or su1Ii.eienq of auppq.
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whether at the time this contract was executed defendant's·
employees renewed their oral assurance that plaintiff would be
given notice if the power failed; in any event, he assumed
that the previous oral agreement was still in effect.
Power failed in plaintiff's area at some time before 12 :01
a. m. on July 5, 1951. At 12 :01 a. m. an unknown person
called the telepl10ne op~rator at defendant's office and informed her that the power was off. The operator promptly
called the repair crew. Defendant's employees patrolled the
area until they located tbe cause of the failure, a nonoperating
voltage regulator. Tbey by-passed tbe regulator and restored
service at about 5 :15 a. m. Defendant's employees did not
at any time notify plaintiff that the power had failed. Plaintiff was at home tbat night and would have answered the
telephone had be been called. When plaintiff arrived at tbe
hatcbery tbe following morning. 78.000 of bis 80,000 trout
were dead.
Plaintiff brought this action for breach of an "oral and
written" contract whereby defendant allegedly promised to
give him reasonable notice in the event that it was necessary
to suspend delivery of electricity. Plaintiff took the position at the trial that the cause of the power failure was
immaterial. and in effect conceded that defendant had exercised
due diligence in supplying him with electricity and in restorin~ service after the failure. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. a nonsuit. and a directed verdict
were denied. and the cause was submitted to the jury. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding damages at $12,480. Defendant'8 motions lor judgment notwitbstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied.
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict.
Defendant contends tbat the trial eou~ Gould not have
The Company will not be Hable for interruption or shortage or inBUftl.·
eieney of IJIlpply, or any loss or clamage of any kind or character
oeeasionea thereby, if same is caused by inevitable accident, act of G04,
fire, strikes, riots, war, or any other cause aeept that arising from its
failure to exercise 1'easonable diligence.
"The Company, whenever it shall. iind it necessary for the purpose of
making repairs 01' improvements to its system, will have the right
to napend temporarily the delivery of electric energy, but in all
nch eases, as TeBsonable notice thereof as circumstances will permit,
win be given to the customel'B, and the making of neb repail'B or im·
provements will be prosecuted as rapidly as may be practicable, and, if
practicable, at ncb times as will cause the least inconvenience to the
customers. "
Bee 44 C.B.C. 718, 719 i 17 CoB.C. US, 1M.

)
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admitted evidence of the oral negotiations and agreements
preceding execution of the written contract on May 12, 1948,
on the grounds that this instrument must be deemed tn be the
complete expression of the agreement of the parties, and that
parol evidence is therefore inadmissible to vary or contradict
its terms. (See Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Cal,2d 402, 410 [202
P.2d 10,7 A.L.R.2d 922] ; Mt'ller v. Security-First Nat. Bank,
219 Cal. 120, 128 [25 P.2d 420] ; Parker v. Meneley, 106 Cal.
App.2d 391, 399 [235 P.2d 101].) Plaintiff, on the other
hand, contends that evidence of the oral agreement in .the
present case was properly admitted, relying· on the rule that
the parol evidence rule does not •• render inadmissible proof
of contemporaneous oral agreements collateral to, and not
inconsistent with, a written contract where the latter is either
incomplete or silent on the subject, and the circumstances
justify an inference that it was not intended to constitute a
final inclusive statement of the transaction. tJ (Ellis v. Klaff.
96 Cal.App.2d 471. 476 [216 P.2d 15] ; Stockburger v. DoZan,
14 Ca1.2d 313, 317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.L.R. 83]; Orawford
v. France, 219 Cal. 439, 443-445 [27 P.2d 645].) It is unnecessary, however, to resolve these contentions if it is determined that under the written contract defendant assumed
the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff
of any interruption in the supply of power. Accordingly,
the first question presented for determination is the extent of
defendant's obligations under the written contract.
[1] As noted above, defendant agreed to furnish electricity in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations
of the Public Utilities Commission. Rule 14 requires de·
fendant to exercise .. reasonable diligence and care" to furnish a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity to its
customers. It further provides that defendant shall "not
be liable for interruption or shortage or insufficiency of supply,
or any loss or damage of any kind or character occasioned
thereby . . . except that arising from its failure to exercise
reasonable diligence." Defendant contends that under these
provisions its duty is limited to exercising reasonable diligence
to furnish a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity,
and that it is under no duty to exercise reasonable care or
diligence to prevent loss from power failure when it is not
legally responsible for the power failure itself. These provisions deal with the duty to supply power, and they make
clear that defendant is not an insurer or guarantor of service.
In no way, however, do they abrogate defendant's general
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duty to exercise reasonable care in operating its system to
avoid unreasonable risks of harm to the persons and property
of its customers. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 451.)
In the present case it is undisputed that defendllnt was
not responsible for the power failure and that it exercised
reasonable diligence to restore service. Accordingly, the
question presented is whether on the record before us it could
reasonably be concluded that its duty. to exercise due care
toward plaintift' in the operation of its system required it
to give notice of the power failure when it knew that the
failure to give notice would result in serious loss. In an
analogous situation, a common carrier does not have a duty to
transport goods immediately, but merely to use diligence to
deliver goods offered for shipment within a reasonable time
in view of all the circumstances. Nevertheless, it is the
general rule that if the carrier is aware that causes· of
unusual delay exist of which the shipper is unaware, and does
not inform the shipper of the facts, the carrier is liable for
injuries caused by delay that would otherwise be excusable.
(Eastern Railway Co.v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140. 145 [35
S.Ct. 489, 59 L.Ed. 878]; Joynes v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
235 Pa. 232. 237 [83 A. 1016] ; 80utheadem E:epress Co. v.
Bowers, Inc., 21 Tenn.App. 295 [109 S.W.2d 851, 854-855] ;
see, 4 Williston on Contracts, § 1095, p. 3074.)
[2] In the present ease, defendant knew that a continuous
supply of electric current to plaintiff was imperative. It
knew that it could assure that supply either by furnishing
the current itself or by promptly notifying plaintiff of any
failure so that be could obtain a substitute supply. Twice,
in fact, defendant did notify plaintiff of an interruption in
its service. Plaintiff bad given defendant bis telephone
number. The repairman who restored service was called to
duty by a night telephone operator at defendant's office.
Had that operator been given a list of customers to call in
the event of a power failure, the loss to plaintiff would have
been averted. Under these circumstances defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care toward plaintift'.
Defendant contends, however, that it is physically impossible for it to first ascertain the loss that may occur to
each of its million customers in the event of a power failure,
and then to take steps, other than diligent efforts to restore
service, to diminish or prevent such losses. Defendant is
under no duty to do so. [3] In the absence of knowledge

)
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of the particular needs of a customer, a utility is not required
to give notice of a power failure. (Brame v. Light, Heat &
Water Co., 95 Miss. 26, 33 [48 So. 728]; Stroup v. Alabama
Power Co., 216 AIll. 290 [113 So. 18, 20, 52 A.L.R. 1075}.)
If it has such knowledge, it is required only to act in a
reasonable manner under the circumstances. [4] It would
not be unduly burdensome to a utility, at least in a case
where, as here, a telephone operator is on duty and the
utility has actual knowledge of the power failure, to require
it to make a reasonable effort to give notice to those customers
who have informed it that they require notice to prevent
serious loss in the event of an interruption in the power supply.
[5] Defendant contends that to require it to give notice
to certain customers and not to others conflicts with the public
policy of this state that no public utility may grant any
preference or advantage in its service to its customers. (Pub.
Util. Code, § 453.) Discrimination is not present however,
since the same duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence
is owed to all customers similarly situated. (See Humphreys
v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 190 Ky. 733, 740 [229
S.W. 117, 21 A.L.R. 664].)
Defendant contends that unless the duty to give notice is
expressly provided for in its contract with plaintiff, recovery
cannot be had in an action on the contract but only in an
action in tort for negligence. [6] By undertaking to supply
electricity to plaintiff, defendant obligated itself to exercise
reasonable care toward him, and failure to exercise such care
has the characteristics of both a breach of contract and a
tort. [7] For certain purposes, such as the statute of
limitations, whether an attachment may issue, and the measure
of damages, it may be necessary to classify an action such as
this one as in contract or in tort. (See generally, L. B.
Laboratories, Inc. v. MitcheU, 39 Ca1.2d 56, 61-63 [244 P.2d
385] .) In the present case, however, it is immaterial whether
the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff
be treated as a breach of contract or a tort. The action was
brought within the period of the shortest applicable statute
of limitations, and since defendant knew of the loss that
might result from its failure to give notice, the measure of
damages under either theory is the same. (Civ. Code, §§ 3300,
3333; see Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal.
App. 5, 15, 18 [121 P. 939].) Accordingly, whether or not
plaintiff erred in pleading defendant's failure to give notice
as a breach of contract rather than as negligence, defendant

)
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was not prejudiced. Under either theory it was under a duty
to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff of the power
failure.
[8] In addition to instructing the jury on the theory that
defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence
to give notice, the trial court gave instructions with respect
to the alleged oral promise that bound defendant to give
notice. On either theory the jury, in returning a verdict for
plaintiff, necessarily found that defendant was aware of
plaintiff's need for notice of a power failure, that it failed
to give him notice,· and that its failure was the proximate
cause of the death of the trout. It is undisputed that defendant knew of the power failure and made no effort to
notify plaintiff. Under these circumstances defendant failed
to exercise reasonable care and diligence, and any error in
instructing with respect to the oral agreement was not prejudicial. (Heple v. Kluge, 114 CaI.App.2d 473. 482-483 [250
P.2d 694].)
[9] Defendant contends that the instruction that if the
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, u you cannot
award the plaintiff any less than sixteen cents per fish," was
prejudieially erroneous. We agree. The amount of damages
sustained by plaintiff was placed in issue by the answer to
the complaint. The ,instruction removed that issue from the
consideration of the jury. Although plaintiff's testimony was
the only evidence concerning the value of the fish, the jury
was the sole judge of his credibility and should have been
left free to disbelieve him. (Blank .v. Cotftn, 20 Cal.2d 457,
461 [126 P.2d 868].) On cross-examination it was shown that
plaintiff was not experienced in the business of raising. fish.
The erroneous instruction on the issue of damages does not
require a complete new trial, since the verdict of the jury on
the issue of liability is amply supported by the evidence.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to
retry the issue of damages only. Each party is to bear its
own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J .. Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J't concurred.
EDMONDS, J .-1 concur in the conclusion that the instruction concerning the measure of damages was prejudicially
erroneous, but I dissent from the order directing that a new
trial be limited to the issue of damages only.

\
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The complaint alleged that the "plaintiff and the defendant
entered into an oral and written contract, whereby defendant
agreed to furnish to plaintiff the necessary power for the
operation of plaintiff's fish hatchery, and further agreed that
in the event it was necessary to suspend temporarily the delivery of electric energy, said defendant would give a rcasonable notice to plaintiff. . . . That on or about the 4th of July,
1948, defendant without warning to plaintiff did cause an
interruption in the supply of electrical power to plaintiff's
fish hatchery, and that as a direct result thereof and before
plaintiff could take the necessary steps for the protection of
the fish contained in said fish hatchery, some 78,000 rainbow
trout died from lack of fresh water."
These allegations state no cause of action either in contract
or in tort. They include no statement that the power company did not give notice, as it assertedly promised to do, nor
do they charge it with any failure to exercise reasonable diligence.
The case was tried upon the theory that the power company
was liable under the terms of the oral contraet relied upon
by Langley. As stated by his counsel in resisting a motion
for a judgment on the pleadings, "The issue is simple. There
was an agreement to give this man notice that the power was
disconnected; the power was disconnected, and he wasn't given
notice. I don't know how else you could say it." Similar statements were made by him in his opening statement to the jury,
~n his closing argument, and in resisting a motion for a directed
verdict. In connection with this last proceeding, counsel for
the power company asked: "In order that we may put in our
defense, will the Court indicate the theory upon which we
may be held liable'" The court's reply was: "The plaintiff's
testimony shows . . . the plaintiff's claim of an oral agreement. "
The issue of the power company's liability was submitted
to the jury under alternative theories of recovery. By one
instruction, the jurors were told: "In addition to the terms
of the written contract, there is evidence of an oral agreement
between the parties providing for the giving of notice to the •
Plaintiff by the Defendant in the event of any interruption
of power. If you find that such an agreement existed, the duty
and obligation of the Defendant to give such notice cannot be
excused by any circumstances, and if you find that the defendant made such an agreement and then failed to fulfill it and,
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as a result thereof, the Plaintiff sustained damage, your ver·
dict must be in favor of Plaintiff. . . . "
A rule of the Public Utilities Commission which, by statute
was a part of the written contract for service to Langley,
stated the duties of the company in the event of an interruption in the delivery of power. The contract, as enlarged by
~he rule, provided for the very contingency which is the basis
of the cause of action, and parol evidence was not admissible
to prove a collateral oral agreement relating to the same subject. (Kunz v. Anglo & London Paris Nat. Bank, 214 Cal.
341, 346-347 [5 P.2d 417]; Pacific States Securities Co. v.
Steiner, 192 Cal. 376 [220 P. 304] ; Heffner v. Gross, 179 Cal.
738,742 [178 P. 860] ; United Iron Works v. Outer H. etc. Co.,
168 Cal. 81, 84-85 [141 P. 917J; Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K.
Armsby Co., 153 Cal. 585, 594 [96 P. 319].) Accordingly,
evidence as to a contemporaneous oral agreement was erroneously admitted, and an instruction upon that theory should
not have been given.
The jurors were also instructed that by the written contract
of the parties, the power company was liable for any loss or
damage occasioned by the interruption of power if such loss
or damage was caused by the failure to exercise reasonable
diligence. They were told that, in appraising the conduct of
the company, they should determine whether it knew of the
hazardous nature of Langley's business and whether it reasonably should have foreseen that an interruption in the supply
of current would result in loss to him ..
In deciding in favor of Langley upon the issue of liability,
the majority say that there is no necessity to decide the question as to the admissibility of the parol evidence "if under
the written contract defendant assumed the duty to exercise
reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff of any interruption in
the supply of pow6r." It has been held that "[i]n cases
where it clearly appears that the jury did hot rely upon the
erroneous instructions, the judgment may be affirmed on the
ground that the error is not prejudiciaV' (Oettinger v.
Stewart, 24 Ca1.2d 133, 140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].)
But here the record does not show that situation. Instead,
it presents a ease tried by counsel for both parties solely as
one for damages arising from the asserted breach of an oral
contract to give nO'tice.
The basis for the conclusion that the erroneous instruction
as to the oral contract was not prejudicial is quite uncertain.
Reference is made to Heple v. Kluge, 114 Cal.App.2d 473

I
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[250 P.2d 694], in which it is stated that an erroneous instruction is not prejudicial" 'when the facts as to which the charge
is made are admitted or uncontradicted, or where no other
conclusion could be reasonably made from the evidence.' "
(P.483.) Apparently, then, the power company is held liable
upon the ground that, as a matter of law, the evidence shows
a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent damage by
giving Langley reasonable notice of any interruption in the
supply of power.
In challenging the propriety of the instruction which stated
that it "was liable for any loss or damage occasioned by the
interruption of power if such loss or damage was caused by
the failure to exercise reasonable diligence," the power company points to the written contract which provides that" The
Company will not be liable for interruption or shortage or
insufficiency of supply, or any loss or damage of any kind or
character occasioned thereby, if same is caused by inevitable
accident . • • or any other cause except that arising from
its failure to exercise reasonable diligence."
That this provision of itself does not create the duty stated
in the instruction, apparently is conceded in the opinion in
which it is stated: .. These provisions deal with the duty to
supply power, and they make clear that defendant is not
an insurer or guarantor of service. In no way, however, do
they abrogate defendant's general duty to exercise reasonable
care in operating its system to avoid unreasonable risks of
harm to the persons and property of its customers. (See
Pub. Util. Code, § 451.)" It appears, therefore, that the basis
of the determination of liability is not a duty specifically
created by the contract, but instead a general statutory one
requiring a public utility to exercise reasonable care toward
its customers, and the written contract is of importance only
to prove such a relationship.
No case is cited which holds that a power company may
be held liable for a failure to notify customers of an accidental interruption of the supply of electricity, as opposed to
a situation where the company suspends the supply of power
to effect repairs or for similar purpose. Brame v. Light, Heat,
d: Water Co., 95 Miss. 26 [48 So. 728], and Stroup v. Alabama Power Co., 216 Ala. 290 [113 So. 18, 52 A.L.R. 1075],
are cases in the latter category. Nor is such a charge made
in the complaint, which alleges only that the "plaintiff and
the defendant entered into an oral and written contract,
whereby defendant • • . agreed that in the event it was neces-

)
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sary to suspend temporarily the delivery of electric energy,
said defendant would give a reasonable notice to plainti1f••• •"
The complaint states no cause of action whatever, but the
case was tried upon the theory that the power company had
made an oral contract to give notice to Langley which it failed
to ful1ill. Evidence in support of such theory was received
erroneously by the trial court and the. jury instructed to
return a verdict for Langley if it found that such a contract
was made and breached. The jurors were also told that, by
the written contract, the power company was liable to Langley
for damages to his property because of a failure to exercise
reasonable diligence "to notify him that the power was off."
That instruction states a theory of recovery inconsistent with
the one based upon an oral contract under which a failure
to give notice was said to be inexcusable "by any circumstances."
It is now held that evidence offered V> prove an oral contract
might properly have been considered by the jury as the basis
of liability upon the inconsistent theory of liability under
the written contract. For that reason, the liability of· the
power company is said to now be established as a matter of
law, under a theory not pleaded in the complaint nor relied
upon by the parties at the trial and upon which the jury was
not instructed.
Under certain circumstances, an appellate court may hold,
as a matter of law, that specific cobduct does or does not
amount to reasonable care toward a plaintiff. (C/. Pirkle
v. Oakdale Union Grammar Seh. Did., 40 Cal.2d 207 [253
P.2d 1]; Gray v. Brinkerhoff, ante, p. 180 [258 P.2d
834].) But in those cases, the issue of the reasonableness of
the conduct involved was presented by the pleadings and considered by the parties with full opportunity to present evidence
upon it. The present record shows an' entirely different
situation.
I would reverse the judgment without quali1ication.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
8, 1953. Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
Dooling, J. pro tem., did not participate thereiD.
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coupled with the boy's love for his own father and his father's
mother-show a case which as a matter of law entitled him
to have his petition determined on its merits. It could only
be determined on its merits by finding whether his interests
would best be served by the appointment of the guardian
whom he sought. If the finding in this respect were favorable, and his nominee was a fit and proper person (as was
found), then he was entitled to an order granting his petition.
The mere conclusional finding (that because the boy had a
place in the home of his mother and stepfather it was not
"necessary or convenient" to appoint a guardian for him)
upon which the trial court and the majority here dispose of
this case, begs the real issue. In fact, disposition of this case
on that ground denies to Richard his day in court on the
real issue.
For further and adequate discussion of this case reference
is made to, and I adopt, the decision prepared for the District
Court of Appeal by Justice Goodell and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Nourse, reported at 254 P.2d 960.
The judgment should be reversed and the case tried on
its merits.
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